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I. IMODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to state the case in opposition to
enactment of the "Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act ("Act"
hereinafter).1 There are several other individuals and institutions
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1. S. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 13904, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. 9 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). All are identical in language.
Hearings on H.R. 13904 were held on May 12, 16, and 25, 1972. See, Hearings on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources (H.R. 13904) before the
Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House. Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. 13904]. A Hearing on S. 2801 was held on June 2, 1972. See Hearings
on S. 2801 before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the
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which share the views expressed herein on this proposed legislation,2 but the majority of those previously testifying on the Act
appear to favor its passage. Probably the most articulate spokesman in favor of the Act, John G. Laylin, has written the article

which immediately precedes this one in this 1973 "Law of the Seas"

issue of the San Diego Law Review. 3 I am sure that Mr. Laylin will
agree that although we both seek to apply high standards of scholarship to our research and writing, nonetheless our articles are essentially exercises in advocacy with the principal objective of enlightening the reader to both the issues and the conflicting opinions
involved in the deep seabed mining problem. Our mutual intent
is to give the reader a framework in which to reach his own conclusions about the optimal system for recovering seabed mineral resources.
In opposing present adoption of the Act, I do not do so on the
basis that within its four corners it ill serves the interests of the
marine mining industry-on the contrary, I shall assume that it well
serves them since it was essentially a product of that industry.
There have, however, been statements to the effect that the Act
does not best serve the resource management interests of the United
States as a whole4 and I find myself in substantial agreement with
those views. However, I am limiting this critique to the broader
perspective of the Act's potential effect on the current international
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2801]. No action was taken by either
subcommittee on the bills during the ninety-second session of Congress.
2. See. e.g., statement of Alan Cranston, United States Senator from
California, in Hearing on S. 2801 at 10; letter from Robert B. Krueger to
the Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, May 9, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13904 at 192;
statement of Wolfgang Friedmann, Professor of International Law, Columbia University, in Hearings on H.R. 13904 at 167; statement of Samuel
R. Levering on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation,
in Hearings on H.R. 13904 at 183; and statement of John J. Logue, Director,
World Order Research Institute, Villanova University, in Hearings on H.R.
13904 at 149.
3. Laylin, The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining Until Superseded by
InternationalAgreement, 10 SAN. DIEGO L. RLv. 425 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Supplemental Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Director for
Ocean Resources, Department of the Interior, on behalf of the InterAgency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, before the Subcommittee on
Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
93d Cong., 1st Sess, (March 1, 1973).

law of the sea negotiations, including the United States position on
law of the sea issues, which goes beyond the industrial aspects of
deep seabed mining. As a result of this broader analysis, I have
concluded that the Act ought not to be adopted at this time-indeed,
not until the Third United Nations Conference on the law of the
Sea 5 has had an opportunity to fully consider the issue and to
either (1) adopt an international regime governing mining of seabed minerals, in which case the need for the Act would disappear,
or (2) fail to reach agreement thus leaving a void in conventional
international law on the subject which might well be filled by a
modified version of the Act.
II. ANALYSiS
My principal arguments against the present enactment of the
Act are threefold: (1) it is inconsistent with this nation's present
oceans policy; (2) it will probably have an adverse effect on the
current law of the sea negotiations; and (3) it contravenes international expectations evidenced in the "principles" resolution of the
General Assembly., All of these arguments are based essentially
on what I believe to be inappropriate timing. As noted above, if the
Third Conference succeeds there will be no need for the Act, yet
if it fails the Act might be an appropriate vehicle. In the interim I
think it inadvisable to impose the Act on the international efforts
to seek an overall revision of the law of the sea because these
negotiations involve ocean related issues other than marine mining
as well as possessing broader implications for world public order.
A.

The Act is Not Consistent with Current United States
Oceans Policy

During the early stages of the current international law of the
sea negotiations a number of alternative regimes were suggested for
governing the exploitation of non-living resources from the seabed
5. In December, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
resolution 2750C (XXV) calling for convocation of a Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter cited as Third Conference]
to be held sometime during 1973 unless postponed by the twenty-seventh
session of the General Assembly on grounds of insufficient progress of
preparatory work. The question of the regime to govern exploitation of

non-living resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is paramount on the agenda for the Third Conference. As a result
of adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3029 (XXVII), a procedural
meeting of the Third Conference is scheduled to take place concurrently
with the 1973 meeting of the General Assembly, and the substantive conference is scheduled to begin in April-May, 1974, in Santiago, Chile.
6. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
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and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction7 Some suggested dividing the world ocean on an equidistance principle, thus
creating '"national lakes" and apportioning the entire seabed and
its resources among a few coastal states.8 Others suggested vesting
title to seabed resourcs in the United Nations, permitting that
organization to govern their disposition.9 Both of these alternatives
were rejected at an early date-the former because it was not politically acceptable to a sufficient number of nations, the latter because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was interested
in permitting the United Nations to secure independent sources of
income.
A third view suggested that no policy decision be made at all
but rather that the world should wait on industrial/political developments in the field-a sort of "invisible hand" approach. 10
Two other alternatives remained under active consideration well
into the deliberations which ultimately led to the development of a
One was the "flag nation" system,
United States oceans policy."
under which exploitation of seabed resources would be governed by
the law of the nation in which the vessel or other platform was
7. For a sampling of various positions advocated, see Christy, Alternative Regimes for Marine Resources Underlying the High Seas, I NAT.
Rts. LAw. 63 (June 1968).
8. See Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea-Security of
Investment, 2 INT'L LAW. 67 (1967) and 1 NAT. REs. LAW. 82 (Jan. 1968).
For a map indicating how such a division of the world ocean might look,
see the chart appended to THm LAW oF T= SE: THE FUTURE OF THE SEA'S
REsouRcEs (Alexander ed. 1968).
9. See Creamer, Title to the Deep Seabed: Prospects for the Future, 9
HIARv. INT'L L.J. 205 (1968); Eichelberger, A Case for the Administration
of Marine Resources Underlying the High Seas by the United Nations, 1
NAT. RES. LAW. 85 (June, 1968).
10. See Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and
Problems, 3 INT'L LAW 31 (1968); Ely, The Fashioning of a Regime to
Govern the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources, paper presented
to the Workshop on Law as Related to Ocean Development Problems
(George Washington University National Law Center, April 20, 1968).
11. In using the phrase "United States oceans policy" in this paper, I
am referring only to (a) Presidential pronouncements, (b) draft treaty

articles submitted by the United States, and (c) major statements made
by members of the United States delegation to the United States Seabed
Committee. There is room even within that limited framework, however,
for differences of opinion concerning just what United States oceans
policy is (or was) and there are even subject matter areas in which it
seems doubtful we have a single unified policy at the present time. Accordingly, the representations of policy stated herein are purely my own
interpretation of the above documents and statements and do not necessarily reflect the position of the United States Government.

registered. 12 Under this system there would be no international
seabed authority, save perhaps for a registry office for the filing
of claims. The other alternative was the creation by international
agreement of a detailed set of rules governing exploration for and
exploitation of seabed resources complete with an attendant international organization to allocate exploration and exploitation rights,
receive and distribute revenues, and regulate resource extractive
operations.
In May, 1970, the President of the United States expressed a preference for the latter alternative, 13 and in August, 1970, the United
States submitted to the United Nations Seabed Committee the
"Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed
Area"'14 which elaborates on the President's proposal with provisions for an international oceans regime providing for participation by all nations. Based on these two documents, it is apparent
that United States oceans policy with respect to the regime to
govern exploitation of non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction contains at least the
following elements:
(1) The regime should be the product of international agreement,
5
not unilateral state action;'
12. For a discussion of the "flag nation" approach, see Ely, American
Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources, 2
INT'L LAW. 215 222-223 (1968); Ely, A Case for the Administration of
Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas by National Interests, 1 NAT.
RES. LAw. 78 (June, 1968).
13. Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL.
737 (1970), 9 INqr'r.. LEGAL MATERALS 807 (1970). See also the statements
of Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State, and John R. Stevenson,
Legal Adviser of he Department of State, in Hearings on Issues Related
to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental
Shelf before the Special Subcomm. on Outer Continental Shelf of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2 (1970).
14. U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.138/25, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERsALs 1046 (1970).
For a detailed examination of the United States draft seabed treaty, see
Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area: Background, Description and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8
See also Gerstle, The UN and the Law of
the Sea: Prospects for the United States Seabeds Treaty, 8 SAN DiEao
L. REv. 573 (1971); Stone, United States Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area, 45 TuL. L. REv. 527 (1971); and Comment, The Nixon
Proposalfor an International Seabed Authority, 50 ORE. L. REv. 599 (1971).
15. President Nixon stated:
I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible
a treaty under which they would renounce all national claims over
the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the
high seas reach a depth of 200 meters ... and would agree to
regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind. Nixon,
supra note 13.

SAN DiEGo L. REv. 259 (1971).
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(2) Some form of international organization should be developed
to regulate seabed exploitation activities;1 and
(3) Adequate provisions should be included within the framework of such an international agreement and organization to establish or ensure (a) protection of the marine environment, (b) a system of peaceful, compulsory disputes settlement, (c) integrity of
investment, (d) revenue sharing, bearing in mind the special needs
of developing nations, and (e) maintenance of multiple use of the
ocean environment. 17
In December, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution calling for convocation of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea to be held sometime during 1973

unless postponed by the 1972 regular session of the General Assembly on the grounds of insufficient progress of preparatory
work.' 8

At the 1972 General Assembly session it was decided to

convene a procedural session of the Third Conference in 1973, concurrent with that winter's session of the General Assembly, and to
initiate the substantive portion of the Third Conference in Santiago,
Chile, in April-May, 1974.19 The United Nations Committee on the
The United States draft seabed treaty (note 14 supra) is, of course, the
specific international agreement which the United States proposed for
adoption at the Third Conference.
16. The President's statement of May 23, 1970 (note 13 supra) also
provides that:
The treaty should establish an international regime for the exploitation of seabed resources beyond this limit [the 200 meter
isobath] ... [A]greed international machinery would authorize
and regulate exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the
continental margins.
The draft seabed treaty (note 14 supra) contains elaborate provisions for
an "International Seabed Resources Authority" (arts. 31-65) and equally

detailed articles on the system of resource disposition (passim; apps. A,
B, and C).
17. The President's statement of May 23, 1970 (supra note 13) included
the following language:
The regime should provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international community purposes,
particularly economic assistance to developing countries. It should
also establish general rules to prevent unreasonable interference
with other uses of the ocean, to protect the ocean from pollution,
to assure the integrity of the investment necessary for such exploitation, and to provide for peaceful and compulsory settlement
of disputes.
The draft seabed treaty also contains provisions on all of these points.
18. G.A. Res. 2750C (XXV) (1970).
19. G.A. Res. 3029 (XXVII) (1972).

Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction 20 has been charged with responsibility for preparatory work for the Third Conference and has been
considering the United States and other seabed regime proposals at
its semi-annual meetings which are now scheduled to continue
through 1973.21

Thus, the Administration has pursued an active and vigorous
policy of internal deliberation and international negotiation which
it hopes will lead to international agreements governing the extraction of seabed resources.
As noted above, there has been introduced in the Ninety-third
Congress the Deep Seabed Hard Mlineral Resources Act, H.R. 9.
This bill would create, by reciprocal domestic legislation, a system
flag nation jurisdiction over hard mineral mining activities on the
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In fairness, it
should be noted that some have argued that the Act does not constitute a "flag nation" approach at all. 22 In my view, however, "flag

nation" means simply that the only law governing operations on
the high seas is that of the state whose flag the vessel or platform
flies, and this is clearly the intent of the Act for it does not establish
any internationallegal system to govern deep seabed mining but
rather relies exclusively on reciprocal domestic legislation. 28 Obviously, such a flag nation system provides benefits only for technologically advanced nations which have or can rapidly develop a
marine mining capability, and, in effect, constitutes an appropriation
of deep seabed hard minerals by those very few nations. It would
foreclose participation in the establishment of rules and operating
regulations by other nations.
20. [Hereinafter cited as Seabed Committee].

The Seabed Committee

was established by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2467A (XXIII)
(1968). It consisted originally of 42 members, but was expanded to 86 in
December, 1972 [G.A. Res. 2750C (XXV) (1970), oper. para. 5] and to 91
in December, 1971 [G.A. Res. 2881 (XXVI) (1971), oper. para. 3].
21. Through G.A. Res. 3029 (XXVII) (1972) the General Assembly
requested the Seabed Committee:
[I] the discharge of its mandate in accordance with resolution
2750C (XXV), to hold two further sessions in 1973 one of five
weeks in New York... and the other of eight wee6s at Geneva
...
with a view to completing its preparatory work, and to submit
a report with recommendations to the General Assembly at its
twenty-eighth session.
22. See, e.g., Letter of John G. Laylin to the Subcomm. on Oceanography,
May 26, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13904 at 195, 196 [hereinafter
cited as Laylin letter].
23. See the discussion of the flag nation principle in Christy, supra
note 7, at 72-74; see also Letter of H. Gary Knight to the Subcomm. on
Oceanography, May 29, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13904 at 198
[hereinafter cited as Knight letter].
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This effect of a "freedom of the high seas" doctrine (which is the
underlying premise of the flag nation system proposed in the
Act) 24 was aptly described by United States Senator Lee Metcalf:
Those nations which have the capacity to lay submarine cables,
do oceanographic research, and mine the deep ocean floor benefit
from the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. Those nations without

marine technology do not benefit.
When one understands that there are dozens of nations which

have never benefitted from the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine, one
can understand the motivation behind their growing demands for
greater participation. What is proclaimed by some to be equal
freedom 2for all nations on the high seas has become in fact unequal
freedom. 5

On several counts, then, the approach of the Act is fundamentally
inconsistent with United States oceans policy.
First, it is United States policy to establish the seabed regime
through international agreements, while the Act relies on domestic
legislation. Granted, the supporters of the Act speak in terms of a
system of reciprocal domestic legislation, but the approach is still
national as opposed to international because the Act itself would

not be the product of international negotiations in which the different national interests could be expressed and accommodated but
rather the product of a single industry as modified by the United
States Congress (which pattern would then be emulated by other
nations on, if the reciprocity is to be effective, a "take it or leave
it" basis). There would thus be no meaningful participation by
members of the international community in establishing operational
rules under the Act.
Second, it is the United States policy to establish international
machinery to govern seabed operations beyond limits of national
jurisdiction. The Act would utilize no international agency, relying
instead solely on national laws and institutions to allocate resources
and settle disputes.
24. The principle of the freedom of the high seas as embodied in Article
2 of the Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, in force Sept. 30, 1962, is that "[t]he

high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty." Absent any jurisdiction based on
territory, the only remaining basis for jurisdiction on the high seas is on
a vessel registration basis, thus the relationship between the concept of
freedom of the high seas and the flag nation principle of jurisdiction.
25. Lee Metcalf, Report on the Outer Continenta Shelf. 117 CoNG. REc.
5758-59 (1971).

. Third, and with respect to the five elements set forth by President
Nixon, 26 the Act does not adequately (or in some cases, at all) meet
the policy objectives there set forth. For instance, it is exceptionally weak in terms of protection of the marine environment and
contains no system at all (save for the implicit diplomatic negotiation) for peaceful, compulsory disputes settlement. Since the Act is
not part of an overall law of the sea agreement, it does not adequately handle the problem of multiple uses of the marine environment nor does it establish a meaningful system for revenue sharing
(reliance is placed instead on the traditional format of Congressionally approved foreign aid).
In view of these basic inconsistencies, I believe that the Act
should be shelved pending the Administration's attempt to secure
the objectives it seeks, at least through conclusion of the Third Conference. If in fact the marine mining industry feels that the Administration's law of the sea policy is an inferior one, then the
better approach would seem to be to attempt to alter that policy
within the executive branch framework available therefor, and not
27
to thwart that policy by urging inconsistent congressional action.
There is an element of futility in the latter approach anyway, since
ultimately (barring an override of a presidential veto) the President will have the last say on whether such a bill becomes law. It
seems unlikely that the President would sign such a bill if he wished
to maintain the Administration's existing oceans policy.

B. The Act's Adoption Would Have an Adverse Effect on Current
Law of the Sea Negotiations
As already noted, this nation is currently involved in complex
negotiations on law of the sea issues leading to the Third Conference. The negotiation process is extremely difficult because of the
existence of a very wide rage of ocean-related issues and a very
large number of countries and special interests. The adoption at
this time of a bill constituting a unilateral act with respect to ocean
resources by the United States could have a highly prejudicial effect
upon the conduct of these negotiations.
First, the adoption of the Act, with its unilateral nature and
appropriative coloration, might well break down any remaining
26. See text accompanying note 17, supra.
27. In fact, the marine mining industry has been taking both avenues,
arguing against Administration policy through the Hard Minerals Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea (U.S.
Government Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force). As evidenced by
the Government's recent testimony on H.R. 9 (see note 33, infra), that
effort was unsuccessful.
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barriers to extension of 200 mile (and more) exclusive economic
resource zones by developing nations. True, the Act itself makes
no specific claim of appropriation with respect to seabed resources,
but one must examine fact as well as form. In fact, the single
underlying justification for the Act is the need for sufficient security of tenure by the mining companies to satisfy their respective
boards of directors or lending institutions concerning the safety of
the economic investment being made. If the Act did not in fact
assure exclusive rights to seabed resources with appropriate legal
safeguards of that exclusive tenure, it would not serve that stated
objective. Thus, in fact, the Act does appropriate to the exclusive
use of the license holder certain designated seabed areas. 28 What
many commentators, including me, fear is that all of the developing
countries whose maritime territorial ambitions the United States
has been holding at bay with the promise of an overall law of the
settlement would react to the Act by saying, in effect, that since
the developed nations had seized those things of value to them in
the oceans the developing nations were therefore entitled to seize
those things of value to them, namely exclusive resource jurisdiction in 200 miles of adjacent coastal waters and seabed. Such a
course of action and reaction would leave little for the "common
heritage of mankind."
The so-called "economic resource zone' concept, in which coastal

states would exercise preferential or exclusive rights with respect
to all living and non-living marine resources, is extremely popular
at the present time among developing countries and may well be
one of the outcomes of the Third Conference. 29 Nonetheless, and
consistent with its current policy, the United States continues to
strive for a meaningful international content to resource extractive activities in the ocean. Were the effect of adoption of the Act
to be to encourage unilateral assertions of resource jurisdiction by
28. For pro and con arguments on this issue, see the Laylin letter, supra
note 22, and the Knight letter, supra note 23.
29. For a typical draft treaty proposal on the subject see Draft Articles
on Exclusive Economic Zone Concept (Presented by Kenya), U.N. Doc.
No. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.10 (7 August 1972). Almost all of the economic
resource zone poposas submitted to date fail to include the five elements
referred to by President Nixon in his May 23, 1970 statement (supra note
13) which elements were restated as essential elements of United States
oceans policy on August 10, 1972, by the head of the Nation's delegation to
the Seabed Committee.

other nations to extensive maritime areas, then the objectives of
United States policy in imposing certain international standards on
such zones would be greatly imperiled. Two hundred mile resource
zones without guarantees for freedom of navigation and international standards concerning dispute settlement, revenue sharing,
conflict of uses, protection of the marine environment, and integrity of investment, would be unacceptable to the United States,
while zones encompassing such considerations would clearly further our national objectives in the ocean. In my view, our nation's
efforts to secure a meaningful international regime could be
thwarted if the effect of the Act were to precipitate of unilateral
claims whose ultimate effect would be to foreclose the possibility of
reaching international agreement on many vital ocean issues.
Second, and for the same reasons stated above, such unilateral
claims could have a prejudicial effect on national defense interests.
The Department of Defense ("DOD") has made clear that maintaining maximum naval mobility is a vital element of our national
security system. DOD has succeeded in having adopted as part of
our current national oceans policy the internationalization rather
than the nationalization of seabed resources in order to protect
against the phenomenon called "creeping jurisdiction" in which
national jurisdiction for limited purposes supposedly tends to ripen
into territorial sea jurisdiction. DOD also fostered the presentation by the United States delegation to the United Nations Seabed
Committee of draft articles providing for free transit through international straits, a change from the old regime of "innocent passage. 3 0° If extensive unilateral claims of jurisdiction over ocean
space by developing nations were to follow enactment of the Act,
DOD's interests in maximum naval mobility and passage through
straits could be seriously compromised.
Third, and finally, the effect of adoption of a flag nation system
for the deep ocean floor and the generation of national claims to
ocean space areas nearer shore would mean that a meaningful international organization to govern activities in ocean space would
be unlikely, thus frustrating achievement of several long range foreign policy objectives of the United States such as compulsory disputes settlement, reduction of conflict potential, and foreign aid.
30. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and
Fisheries Submitted to Sub-Committee HI by the United States of America,
U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (1971). For a more extensive analysis
of the straights passage problem, see Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals of the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through International Straights,51 ORE. L. REv. 759, 769-785 (1972).
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Concern has been expressed by proponents of the Act that certain developing countries are opposed to the recovery of deep seabed mineral resources by anybody. These nations are purportedly
motivated by a desire to limit competition with respect to their
upland and offshore mineral resources. Accordingly, it is argued,
many developing countries-including some petroleum exporting
countries-will obstruct and frustrate efforts in the Seabed Committee and at the Third Conference to adopt an international regime which would facilitate the exploitation of seabed mineral
resources. It is therefore concluded by these individuals that the
interminable delay we can expect as the result of this posture will
adversely prejudice national interests in the development of marine
mining technology and the recovery of needed mineral resources.
I cannot find fault with the logic of such an argument, but I believe one of the underlying assumptions-the potential adverse
impact on prices-is not completely valid. Several studies have
been published concerning the economic implications of development of seabed mineral resources. Among these is a report prepared by the Secretary General of the United Nations titled Pos-

sibZe Impact of Sea-Bed Mineral Production in the Area Beyond
National Jurisdiction on World Markets, With. Special Reference
to the Problems of Developing Countries: A Preliminary Assessment.31 This report concludes that there would not likely be any
significant adverse economic impact from the production of manganese nodules and other seabed minerals. Similar conclusions
were reached by the United States Government in its study entitled Economic Implications of Seabed Mineral Resource Developmnent.32 Thus, the facts indicate that the fears of these developing
countries about maintaining market prices for their mineral exports are probably unfounded. Once the data in these studies is
understood by the affected nations, I doubt seriously whether their
hesitancy over supporting an international regime to facilitate the
mining of deep-sea mineral will continue. On the other hand, enactment of the Act would, as noted above, likely have the effect
31. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/36 (28 May 1971); see also the supplemental
Additional Notes on the Possible Economic Implications of Mineral Production from the International Sea-Bed Area, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.13S/73 (12
May 1972).
32. July 6, 1971.

of promoting national claims to ocean space and adversely affecting
the chances for international agreement on the use of ocean space.
C. The Act Would Be Contrary to International Expectations
Expressed in General Assembly Resolution 2749.
In December, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
resolution 2749 which provides, among other things, that:
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means
by States or persons, natural or juridicial, and no State shall claim
or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridicial, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources
incompatible with the international regime to be established and
the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding exploration and exploitation of the
resources of the area and other related activities shall be governed
by the international regime to be established.

7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether landlocked or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries. 83
This resolution was adopted by a vote of 108 in favor, none against,
and 14 abstentions. The United States voted in favor of the resolution.
Although it is true that General Assembly resolutions do not
constitute binding legal obligations, nonetheless such resolutions
do, when adopted by such overwhelming majorities as was the case
with Resolution 2749, represent the expectations of the international community and thus create political and moral norms which
should not be dismissed lightly.34 The legal regime proposed by
33. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
34. It has been suggested that Resolution 2749 was ultimately adopted
only to break an impasse with the understanding that there was not a
true consensus on the major issues involved. Thus, this argument proceeds,
the unanimity evidenced by the 108-0-14 vote is misleading. This may or
may not be the case-it certainly would be worthwhile to engage in a study
of the circumstances surrounding adoption of that resolution-but in any
event the plain language of the document clearly imparts the expectation
that international rather than national solutions to seabed mining problems
are to be favored, and it is essentially on that basis that I argue the incompatibility of the Act and Resolution 2749.

Hard Mineral Resources Act
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the Act contradicts each of the major premises of Resolution 2749
quoted above.
For example, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2749 states that the area
"shall not be subject to appropriation by any means," (emphasis
added) the latter wording clearly covering de facto claims or appropriations regardless of the form in which they are couched. (I
have already alluded to the form-fact dichotomy of the Act in Part
ILB supra). Paragraph 3 is even more explicit in prohibiting acquisition of rights other than in accordance with the international
regime to be established. Certainly the Act creates rights in the
seabed area, but it is not possible to say at this time whether they
are compatible with the international regime to be established.
However, viewing the principles resolution in its entirety, there
are some obvious discrepancies between the regime proposed by
the Act and those basic components of an international seabed
regime envisioned by the resolution.
Further, the lip service paid to revenue sharing by the Act does
not carry forward the objective of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2749
which calls for seabed activities to be "carried out for the benefit
of mankind as a whole... taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries." The Act serves
the marine mining industries of technologically advanced nations,
not mankind as a whole.
III.

CONCLUSION

As indicated above, the principal issue in consideration of the
Act is one of timing. The long range objectives of the Act are
laudable-exploitation of needed mineral resources and preservation of the technological lead of the United States in recovery and

beneficiation techniques. The only real question is whether we
take unilateral action now or attempt for another two years
(through the 1974-1975 Third Conference) to secure international
agreements on the subject. I have stated the case above for allowing our Government to continue its negotiating efforts and believe
that that is the best course both for our Nation and the international community.
IV. PosTscRIPT
As this article was being completed, the United States Govern-

ment (which had in 1972 avoided taking a firm position for or
against the Act), in testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, took a position quite similar to that set forth in this article. 35
I hasten to add that the expression of my own views probably had

little or nothing to do with the Government's decision. Nonetheless, the Administration has pleaded with Congress to give it until
the conclusion of the Third Conference (but no later than 1975) to
work out an acceptable international seabed regime. That position
is subject to review, however, and should insufficient progress be
made toward convening of the Third Conference, or should that
Conference fail to produce the requisite agreement, the Administration has indicated its support for an approach such as that taken
in the Act (although members of the Inter-Agency Law of the Sea
Task Force are working on their own version of a seabed mining
bill).
If Congress heeds the advice of the Administration on this point,
then we will have the opportunity to see if the international community has reached a sufficient stage of sophistication to adopt an
international seabed regime, or whether it will take a step backward in international law and relations by resorting to unilateral
activities in the ocean.

35. See Statement of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Advisor, De-

partment of State, and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the
Law of the Sea, before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., March
1, 1973; and Supplemental Statement by Leigh S. Ratiner, note 4 supra.
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APPENDIX A
[The text of H.R. 9 (and S. 1134), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [S. 2801 and
H.R. 13904 in the 92d Cong.] which is the subject of the preceding articles
by Mssrs. Laylin and Knight, is reprinted below for the reader's use.-Ed.]
93D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H.R. 9

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JA-uARY 3, 1973

A BILL
To provide the Secretary of the Interior with authority to promote the
conservation and orderly development of the hard mineral resources of
the deep seabed, pending adoption of an international regime therefor.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act".
DEFINITIONS

SEc. 2. 'When used in this Act(a) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior;
(b) "deep seabed" means the seabed and subsoil vertically lying seaward and outside the Continental Shelf of the United States and the
Continental Shelves of foreign states, as defined in the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf;
(c) "block" means an area of the deep seabed having four boundary
lines which are lines of longitude and latitude, the width of which may
not be less than one-sixth the length and shall include either of two
types of blocks: (i) "surface blocks" comprising not more than forty
thousand square kilometers and extending downward from the seabed
surface to a depth of ten meters; (ii) "subsurface blocks" comprising not
more than five hundred square kilometers and extending from ten meters
below the seabed surface downward without limitation;
(d) "hard mineral" means any mineral, metalliferous mud, or other
nonliving substance other than oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and any other
substance which both naturally occurs and is normally recovered in

liquid or gaseous form;
(e) "development" means any operation of exploration and exploitation, other than prospecting, having the purpose of discovery, recovery,
or delivery of hard minerals from the deep seabed;
(f) "prospecting" means any operation conducted for the purpose of
making geophysical or geochemical measurements, bottom sampling, or

comparable activities so long as such operation is carried on in a manner
that does not significantly alter the surface or subsurface of the deep
seabed;
(g) "commercial recovery" means recovery of hard minerals at a substantial rate of production (without regard to profit or loss) for the primary purpose of marketing or commercial use and does not include recovery for any other purpose such as sampling, experimenting in recovery
methods, or testing equipment or plant for recovery of hard minerals;
(h) "person" means any government or unit thereof and any juridical
or natural person;
(i) "reciprocating state" means any foreign state designated by the
President as a state having legislation or state practice or agreements
with the United States which establish an interim policy and practice
comparable to that of the United States under this Act;
(j) "international registry clearinghouse" shall means a recording
agency or organization designated by the President in cooperation with
reciprocating states.
SECRETARY'S POWERS; REQUIREMENT OF LICENSE
SEC. 3. The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this Act and
may prescribe such regulations as are necessary to its execution. No person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall directly or indirectly develop any portion of the deep seabed except as authorized by license issued pursuant to this Act or by a reciprocating state. Nothing in
this Act or any regulation prescribed thereunder shall preclude, or impose
any restriction upon, scientific research or prospecting by any person of
any portion of the deep seabed not subject to an outstanding license issued
under this Act or by any reciprocating state, or shall require any applicant for a license or any licensee to divulge any information which could
prejudice its commercial position.
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES; LITATIONS AND CONDITIONS
SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary shall issue licenses pursuant to section 5,
recognizing rights, which shall be exclusive as against all persons subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States or of any reciprocating state, to
develop the block designated in such license, as follows: (1) as to each
surface block, the rights shall extend to manganese-oxide nodules and all
other hard minerals at the surface of the deep seabed or located vertically
below to a depth not exceeding ten meters; (ii) as to each subsurface
block, the rights shall extend to all hard minerals located more than ten
meters beneath the surface of the deep seabed.
(a) Where a subsurface block leased to one person is adjacent to a surface block leased to a different person, the licensee of the subsurface block
shall have the right to penetrate the surface block and the Secretary shall
prescribe regulations to prevent undue interference by one with the other,
giving reasonable priority to the first licensee. No license shall preclude
scientific research by any person in licensed areas where such activities do
not interfere with development by the licensees.
(c) Every license issued under this Act shall remain in force for fifteen
years and, where commercial recovery of hard minerals has been achieved
from a licensed block within fifteen years, such license shall remain in
force so long as commercial recovery from the block continues. The Secretary shall prescribe, as conditions for every license issued pursuant to
this Act, minimum annual expenditures as specified in section 7, and requirements to protect the environment, prevent unreasonable interference
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with other ocean uses, and promote arbitral settlement of disputes. Where
circumstances beyond the control of a licensee impair its ability to develop
any portion of the deep seabed held under such license, the term of the
license and the dates for complying with any other license condition shall
be extended for an equal length of time.
LICENSING PROCEDURES; CLEARINGHOUSE
SEC. 5. (a) A license as specified in section 4 shall be issued by the Secretary to the first qualified person who makes written application and
tenders a fee of $5,000 for the block specified in the application, except for
portions of the deep seabed excluded from licensing pursuant to section 6.
A person shall be deemed qualified for a license under this Act if and only
if that person is a citizen of the United States, or a corporation or other
juridical entity organized under the laws of the United States, its States,
territories, or possessions, and meets such technical and financial requirements as the Secretary may prescribe in order to assure effective and orderly development of the licensed portion.
(b) The Secretary shall act upon each license application within sixty
days of its filing, and if the license is not issued or is issued for less than
the entire portion of the deep seabed sought in the application, the Secretary shall in announcing his action to the applicant state reasons in
writing for declining to issue the license for the entire portion sought. The
Secretary shall, and the applicant or licensee may, notify within fourteen
days the international registry clearinghouse of the filing or withdrawal
of an application for a license under this Act, the issuance, denial, expiration, surrender, transfer, or revocation of such license, or the relinquishment of any licensed portion of the deep seabed.
(c) The function of the international registry clearinghouse shall consist
solely of keeping records of notices of applications for licenses, the issuance,
denial, transfer, or termination of licenses, and the relinquishment of licensed portions of the deep seabed. Its records shall be available for
public inspection during the business hours of every working day. Pending designation of such clearinghouse, notice to the Secretary shall constitute notice to the international registry clearinghouse within the meaning
of this Act.

AREAS WITHDRAWN FROM LICENSING; DENSITY LIMITATIONS

SEC. 6. (a) No license shall be issued under this Act for any portion of

the deep seabed (i) which has been relinquished by the applicant under
license issued by any State within the prior three years; (ii) which is subject either to a prior application for a license or an outstanding license
under this Act or from a reciprocating State: Provided, That notice thereof
has been received by the international registry clearinghouse within fourteen days of such application or license; (iii) which if licensed would result in the applicant holding under licenses issued by any State or States
more than 30 per centum of that area of the deep seabed which is within
any circle with a diameter of one thousand two hundred and fifty kilometers where the licensed area consists of surface blocks and one hundred
twenty-five kilometers where the licensed area consists of subsurface blocks;
or (iv) which if licensed would result in the United States licensing more
than 30 per centum of such area.

(b) No license shall be issued or transferred under this Act, and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have any substantial interest in any license issued by any State, which would result in any
person directly or indirectly holding, controlling, or having any substantial
interest in licenses for any portion of the deep seabed licensed by any

State which that person could not hold directly under this Act because of
the limitations of items (i) and (iii).
MINflVIUM ANNUAL EXPENDITURES

SEC. 7. It shall be a condition of each license issued under this Act that
the licensee make or cause to be made minimum expenditures for development of each licensed block in the following amounts per block until commercial recovery from such block is first achieved:
Year
Amount per year
1
$100,000
2 to 5
200,000
6 to 10
350,000
11 to 15
700,000
Expenditures for offsite operations, facilities, or equipment shall be included in computing required minimum expenditures where such offsite
expenditures are directly related to development of the licensed block or
blocks. Expenditures in any year in excess of the required minimum may
be credited to later years by the licensee.
RELINQUISIMENT; TRANSFER OR LOSS OF LICENSE
SEC. 8. (a) Within ten years of the date any block is licensed under this
Act and not later than the start of commercial recovery from such block,
the licensee shall by written notice to the Secretary relinquish 75 per
centum of such block measured laterally. The relinquishment shall be
such that the unrelinquished area conforms to the shape of a block as defined under section 2 (c). The licensee shall select the area of the block
to be relinquished and as many as four contiguous blocks of the same type
held by the licensee may be treated as a single unit for purposes of selecting the 75 per centum to be relinquished.
(b) Any license issued under this Act may be surrendered at will and,
on written consent of the Secretary, transferred to any person who qualifies under section 5 (a) and is not precluded from holding such license by
section 6(b). Such license may be revoked for willful, substantial failure
to comply with this Act, any regulation prescribed thereunder, or any license condition, in a proceeding in an appropriate United States district
court: Provided, That the Secretary has first given the licensee written
notice of such violation and the licensee has failed to remedy the violation
within a reasonable period of time.
ESCROW FUND

S~c. 9. A fund shall be established for assistance, as Congress may
hereafter direct, to developing reciprocating States. The United States
shall deposit in this fund each year an amount equivalent to -* per centum
of all license fees collected during that year by the United States pursuant
to section 5(a) and an amount equivalent to -* per centum of all income
tax revenues derived by the United States which are directly attributable
to recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed pursuant to licenses is-

sued under this Act: Provided, That the amount deposited by the United
States per license issued and per unrelinquished square kilometer under
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license shall not exceed the amount contributed for assistance to developing reciprocating States by other licensing reciprocating States (except developing States) per license issued by them and per unrelinquished square
kilometer licensed by them. For the purposes of this section, "developing
reciprocating State" means a reciprocating State designated by the President, taking into consideration per capital gross national product and other

appropriate criteria.
*

An appropriate amount to be determined by the Congress.
INVESTMENT PROTECTION

SEC. 10. (a) Licenses issued under this Act may be made subject to any
international regime for development of the deep seabed hereafter agreed
to by the United States: Provided, That such regime fully recognizes and
protects the exclusive rights of each licensee to develop the licensed block
for the term of the license: And provided further, That the United States
fully reimburses the licensee for any loss of investment or increased costs
of the licensee incurred within forty years after issuance of the license due
to requirements or limitations imposed by the regime more burdensome
than those of this Act. The United States shall bear any payment of whatever kind required of the licensee under the international regime. The
Secretary shall determine in the first instance the amount owing on all
claims for reimbursement under this subsection.
* per
(b) On annual payment by any licensee of a premium of $$1,000 of insured risk of loss, the United States shall guarantee to reimburse the licensee for any loss caused through any interference by any
other person (whether or not violative of international law) with development by the licensee pursuant to the license and from any loss caused by
recovery by any person not authorized by the licensee of hard minerals
from any block subject to such a license. The Secretary shall determine
in the first instance the amount owing on all claims for reimbursement under this subsection.
* A suitable premium to be determined by the Congress.
NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

SEC. 11. All hard minerals recovered from the deep seabed under a license issued pursuant to this Act shall be deemed to have been recovered
within the United States for purposes of the import and tax laws and regulations of the United States and such laws and regulations shall be administered so that there shall be no discrimination between hard minerals
recovered from the deep seabed and comparable hard minerals recovered
within the United States.
PENALTIES; RIGHTS OF ACTION

SEC. 12. (a) Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
may be enjoined from directly or indirectly violating this Act or any regulations prescribed thereunder, interfering with development pursuant to
any license issued under this Act or by any reciprocating state, or removing without authority of the licensee any hard minerals from any block

subject to such a license. Any such person who directly or indirectly
commits such violation, interference, or removal, shall be liable to any
person injured thereby for actual damages. Any such willful violation,
interference, or removal by such person shall be a misdemeanor punishable
by up to six months' imprisonment, a fine of $2,000, or both.
(b) The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction to
enforce subsection (a) and to revoke licenses under section 8 (b), and such
actions may be initiated in any judicial district where the defendant resides or may be found. Any regulation prescribed by the Secretary under
this Act, any issuance, denial, or condition of a license under this Act by
the Secretary, any consent or refusal of consent by the Secretary to the
transfer of such license, and any determination of the Secretary allowing
or disallowing reimbursement under section 10, shall be subject to judicial
review on petition of any interested person in accordance with chapter 158
of title 28 of the United States Code.
ENACTMENT DATE; SEPAArBILITY

SEC. 13. This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment. If any
provision of this Act or any application thereof is held invalid, the validity
of the remainder of the Act or of any other application shall not be affected
thereby.

